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We review a quantum key distribution protocol, recently proposed by us, that makes
use of a two-way quantum channel. We provide a characterization of such a protocol from
a practical perspective, and consider the most relevant individual-particle eavesdropping
strategies against it. This allows us to compare its potentialities with those of the standard
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3I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal works by Bennett and Brassard [1] and by Ekert [2] Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) has made impressive progresses [3], which can be roughly grouped
into two main categories: on the one side there are theoretical progresses, among which
the unconditional security of QKD is the most relevant one [4–8]; on the other side there
are experimental progresses, almost exclusively in the field of quantum optics, which re-
cently led to long-haul and high-rate QKD experiments [9–12]. The relevance of these
advances promoted QKD as the most applicative research of quantum information, and
also triggered the start-up of companies based on this technology [13].
Recent research on QKD is mainly focused on closing the existing gap between the
perfect theory of the unconditional security proofs and the imperfect application of such
a theory in the real world. This originated the definition of practical QKD [14, 15] which
deals with the proper modeling of devices like photon sources, light modulators and single-
photon detectors [16, 17]. By consequence, any new proposal relevant to the field of QKD
can not set aside the practicality issue. This is even truer if one looks at the quantum
hacking strategies based on practical imperfections recently accomplished by the group of
Trondheim [18].
In this paper we want to characterize from a practical point of view a novel form of
QKD based on a two-way quantum channel. Two-way channels are already used in QKD
either in those setups based on a Plug-and-Play configuration [19] or in those using the
Cascade error correction procedure [20]. However these two examples do not represent
a two-way quantum channel: in the first case only the backward channel ought to be
considered quantum; in the second case neither the forward nor the backward channel are
quantum.
4The first input to two-way QKD came from Bostro¨m and Felbinger’s Ping-Pong pro-
tocol [21], where the question of the security of Quantum Dense Coding [22] was posed
in terms of “deterministic and secure direct communication in presence of entanglement”.
The Ping-Pong protocol was demonstrated insecure [23, 24] but a revised, more secure,
version was soon after proposed in [25] (see also [26–28]).
Moving from these initial steps novel two-way schemes without entanglement were
presented in [29], in [30] and then by us in [31]. This last scheme, named “LM05”, had
the merit of being more feasible and secure than the protocol in [21] and it came with the
first security proof against non-trivial individual-particle attacks. As a matter of fact its
experimental realization was proposed [32], proved in principle [33] and recently realized
in the third telecom window [34]. Also, the protocol was generalized to a higher number
of states [35, 36] and to higher-dimensional Hilbert spaces [37–39].
Despite these improvements, a complete realization of the LM05 still remains an exper-
imental challenge. The main problem is that in the original protocol both the forward and
the backward channels are tested by the users to guarantee the security of the protocol. In
particular the test of the backward channel requires that with a certain probability one of
the users (Alice) prepares a qubit in exactly the same physical state as the one prepared
by the other user (Bob) [31]. This is difficult in practice because all the relevant degrees of
freedom of the qubit (wavelength, timing, bandwidth, etc.) must be accurately controlled
by Alice.
In this work we modify the original LM05 protocol by removing the test of the backward
channel and show that the resulting protocol is still secure against several single-particle
attacks by the eavesdropper (Eve). We also provide the state-of-the-art of the so called
“deterministic QKD” [40] with a two-way quantum channel, together with a set of tools
which can be used and further improved towards a final security proof of the scheme.
5Throughout the work we compare our deterministic protocol with the standard non-
deterministic BB84 [42].
II. THE PROTOCOL
The practical rendering of the LM05 protocol (see Fig.1) can be obtained from the
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FIG. 1: Schematics of the practical LM05 protocol. Bob randomly prepares qubits of Xˆ and Zˆ
bases. With probability (1-c) Alice encodes data on the qubits (Encoding Mode, EM) and with
probability (c) she measures the qubits (Control Mode, CM). Bob measures the returning qubits
in the same bases they were prepared and finally decodes Alice’s information. The noise check on
the backward path, present in the original protocol [31], is removed in the present version.
original protocol [31] by removing the test performed by the users on the backward channel.
Bob prepares a qubit in one of the four states |0〉, |1〉 (the Pauli Zˆ eigenstates), |+〉, |−〉
(the Pauli Xˆ eigenstates), and sends it to his counterpart Alice. With probability c Alice
switches to Control Mode (CM) and uses the qubit to test the channel noise or, with
probability 1 − c, she switches to Encoding Mode (EM) and uses the qubit to encode a
6bit of information. The CM consists in a projective measurement of the qubit along a
basis randomly chosen between Zˆ and Xˆ, in a way equal to the protocol BB84 [1]. In the
original protocol [31] this step was followed by the preparation of a new qubit in the same
state as the outcome of the measurement; however this step is removed from the present
protocol as it is not practical to implement. In fact, to conceal the chosen modality to
Eve, Alice should prepare a qubit in exactly the same physical state as the one prepared
by Bob, i.e. same wavelength, bandwidth, time-width and intensity. This is not possible
without a sophisticated control of the experimental devices. The lack of a direct test of
the backward channel thus represents the fundamental difference respect to the protocol
described in [31]. The EM is a modification of the qubit state according to one of the
following transformations: the identity operation Iˆ, which leaves the qubit unchanged and
encodes the logical ‘0’, or iYˆ ≡ ZˆXˆ operation, which flips any of the qubits prepared
by Bob and encodes the logical ‘1’. After the encoding step Alice sends the qubit back
to Bob who measures it in the same basis he prepared it; in case of an EM run this
feature allows Bob to deterministically infer Alice’s operation, without any need of a basis
reconciliation procedure, typical of a non-deterministic setup like BB84 [46]. Notice that
Bob’s measurement does not depend on the modality chosen by Alice (EM or CM): Bob
will perform in any case his measurement, with a nonzero probability to detect a vacuum
pulse due either to the natural losses of the channel or to a CM run by Alice or to a specific
attack by Eve. After the quantum communication, Alice will tell on the classical channel
which runs were CM and which were EM. We also point out that the direct test of at
least one of the two channels is a necessary procedure for any two-way quantum protocol.
In fact there exist attacks, like Trojan-horse [47], Quantum Man-in-the-Middle [48] and
Double-CNOT [35, 48], described in next Section III C, which can not be detected by Alice
and Bob using only the EM runs.
7Even if the bases are not revealed for the EM runs, they are revealed for comparing
the data acquired during the CM runs. This, in complete analogy with the BB84, will
provide the users with an estimate of the noise present on the forward channel in terms of
the QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) q1, defined as the ratio of the number of wrong bits
over the number of total bits coming from CM runs. Beside q1, the users can also estimate
a second QBER QAB which comes from a fraction of the EM runs, in which Alice reveals
on the public channel her encoding.
While q1 is used to give an upper bound on Eve’s information, QAB is used to provide
an estimate of Alice and Bob mutual information, IAB, with IAB = H(A)−H(A|B) and
H the usual Shannon entropy [49]. In case A is a random binary variable we have:
IAB(QAB) = 1−H(QAB). (1)
Note that there is no definite relation between the two QBERs q1 and QAB. A precise
relation can only be found by assuming a particular strategy by Eve, as done in [31] or by
adopting a particular noise model, as we shall do in the following.
Eve’s information is given in terms of mutual information between Eve and Alice, IAE ,
or Eve and Bob, IBE . Then the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner (CK) theorem [50] is used to decide
whether the QKD session is secure or not: Alice and Bob can establish a secret key
(using Forward Error Correction and Privacy Amplification) if and only if IAB ≥ IAE or
IAB ≥ IBE . Depending on the use of the IAE or IBE in the CK theorem, it is possible
to define respectively the secrecy capacity of the Direct Reconciliation (DR), CDRs , and of
the Reverse Reconciliation (RR), CRRs , as follows:
CDRs (QAB, q1) = IAB(QAB)− IAE(q1), (2)
CRRs (QAB, q1) = IAB(QAB)− IBE(q1), (3)
where IAE , IBE are the upper bounds to Eve’s mutual information with Alice and Bob
8respectively, which as said are functions of q1 only. Notice that according to the CK theo-
rem is sufficient that only one of the secrecy capacities is greater than zero to have a secure
communication. In order to accomplish a DR, the users must execute the Forward Error
Correction in the direction that goes from Alice to Bob; in other terms it will be Alice to
transmit to Bob the parity bits to correct the errors, and it will be Bob to correct the errors
in his string to match Alice’s string. For the RR the roles of the users are the opposite.
We remark that to have a tentatively deterministic Direct Communication [21], it must
be Alice to lead the reconciliation procedure, because only her knows the random choice
between CM and EM. This means that the security of a deterministic communication
closely depends on the mutual information IAE and on the DR procedure.
The LM05 protocol has already been tested in free-space at the wavelength of 800nm
using the photon polarization as a quantum carrier of the information [33, 51]. However
this choice is not ideal in optical fibers because birefringence makes the polarization change
randomly. The optimal implementation is to use an encoding based on the relative phase
between two pulses separated in time. In this way the channel noise seen by the two pulses
is the same, and their relative phase remains stable. The only left noise is the one coming
from a misalignment between Alice’s and Bob’s apparatuses. To eliminate this source of
noise one can adopt the mechanism of passive compensation, invented in [52] and employed
for QKD in the Plug-and-Play system [53–56]. This technique fits very natural with the
EM of LM05, thus letting the implementation reported in [34].
In the next sections we consider the most relevant individual attacks against LM05.
Following the approach given in [57] we group the attacks into two main categories: zero-
loss and zero-QBER attacks. The former, analyzed in Section III, do not introduce any
loss in the channel but introduce noise; the latter, treated in Section IV, introduce losses,
but no noise. This description allows to a certain extent a fair comparison between one-way
9and two-way deterministic QKD.
III. ZERO-LOSS EAVESDROPPING
A. Intercept and resend attack - IR
The simplest attack in which Eve acquires information from the communication chan-
nel, thus unavoidably introducing noise in the same channel, is the Intercept and Resend
(IR), which follows for the LM05 protocol the same steps as for the BB84 protocol [1, 57].
In the IR against LM05 Eve measures the photon coming out from Bob along one
basis chosen at random between the two bases used by Bob, i.e. Zˆ and Xˆ [58]. Then she
takes note of the outcome and forwards to Alice the qubit projected by her measurement
in a certain state |ψ〉. Alice, in EM, will flip or not-flip this state, and sends it back to
Bob. Eve measures on the backward path the state emerging from Alice box, using the
same basis previously used in the forward path, thus learning the information; finally she
forwards the qubit to Bob.
This attack can be detected through the QBER q1 while running the CM. It is easy
to see that when Eve perchance measures in the same basis of Alice and Bob, she creates
no error in the forward channel; on the contrary, for different basis, she creates an error
with probability 1/2. In both cases she acquires full information about Alice’s encoding,
causing an average value of q1 equal to 1/4.
While IR provides Eve with full knowledge about Alice’s encoding it does not provide
her with full knowledge about the result of Bob’s measurement. In fact the first measure-
ment by Eve destroys the initial state prepared by Bob; furthermore the basis used by
Bob is never revealed in LM05. This entails that Eve can foresees Bob’s result only three
times over four, that is when she perchance measures along the same basis as Bob and
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when she measures along the wrong basis but accidentally guesses the correct final result.
This argument, together with the previous one, implies the following relations for the IR:
q1 = 0.25,
QAE = 0⇒ IAE = 1,
QBE = 0.25⇒ IBE = 1−H(QBE) ' 0.19. (4)
In the above equations QAE and QBE are defined in a way similar to QAB. For example
QAE can be thought as the QBER that Alice and Eve would find if they compare their
classical strings which are composed, respectively, by all the encodings transmitted to Bob
and by all the data acquired by Eve by means of the IR. Recall that the above equations
are connected with the direct (DR) and reverse (RR) reconciliation of the LM05 and
provide the direct and reverse secrecy capacity of the protocol. The situation described by
Eq.(4) can be compared with that of BB84, where for q1 = 0.25 the information acquired
by Eve is IAE = IBE = 1/2 [3].
Of course Eve can decide to effect or not to effect IR in a certain run. In other terms
she can effect IR only on a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the runs. This modifies Eqs.(4) into the
new ones:
q1 = 0.25 ξ,
IAE = ξ,
IBE ' 0.19 ξ. (5)
As said above, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is a simple function of
the QBER QAB, which is measured by the users by sacrificing a part of the data collected
during the EM. It is straightforward to realize that for IR the two QBERs of the LM05
11
are equal:
QAB = q1. (6)
Eq.(6) defines a first relation between the two QBERs measured in the LM05 protocol.
Although this relation is not general, it deserves attention for it describes quite accurately
the noise model pertaining to an experimental fiber-based setup like the one in Ref. [34],
where the phase-drift noise arising in the optical fiber can be compensated both at the end
of the forward channel and at the end of the backward channel through the passive Plug-
and-Play auto-compensation technique [53–56]. Hence, we will use again the noise model
of Eq.(6) to settle a homogeneous comparison between the various attacks put forward
by Eve against the LM05 protocol. Of course, other models of noise are possible (see e.g.
Ref. [33]).
In Fig. 2 we summarize what obtained thus far with the curves pertaining to the mutual
information between Alice, Bob and Eve in LM05. In the same figure we also plot the
curve pertaining to the analogous IR attack against BB84 (Section VI.D of [3]), for which
IAE = IBE . It can be seen that the curve IAE in LM05 is always above the curve of BB84,
while the curve IBE is always below it. This, according to the CK theorem, Eq.(2), implies
that the reverse (direct) secrecy capacity of LM05 is always higher (lower) than that of
BB84 for the IR attack. The security thresholds obtained from the CK theorem against
the IR attack for LM05 in DR and RR and for BB84, in the noise model of Eq.(6), are
given by the intersection points of the plotted curves, and are explicitly written below:
LM05DR : secure against IR if q1 < 11.9%
LM05RR : secure against IR if q1 < 25.0%
BB84 : secure against IR if q1 < 17.1%
Note that the BB84 security threshold of 17.1% is higher than the one pertaining to the
12
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FIG. 2: Mutual information versus q1 in LM05 and BB84 in case of IR attack by Eve. IAB : solid
line; ILM05AE : dot-dashed line; I
LM05
BE : dotted line; I
BB84
AE = I
BB84
BE : dashed line. The security
thresholds are reported at the top of the frame.
optimal individual eavesdropping [59] which amounts to 14.6%. In fact the simple-minded
IR attack just described is not optimal either for BB84 or for LM05. However they have
been used in [57] and later in [34] to provide direct measurable quantities easily applicable
in the experimental situation.
B. Non-orthogonal attack - NORT
The IR analyzed above can give Eve an information linearly varying with the QBER
q1, as synthesized by Eqs. (5) and Fig. 2. It is possible for Eve to increase her information
as a function of q1 by performing non-orthogonal measurements [3] on both the forward
and the backward paths. This strategy has been initially described in [31] by considering
the mutual information as function of the “detection probability”. Now we use the same
approach but in terms of QBER.
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Given the four states prepared by Bob, and Eve’s ancillary states |ε〉, we can write the
most general operation Eve can do on traveling qubit at point E1 of Fig.1 as:
|0〉 |ε〉 → |0〉 |ε00〉+ |1〉 |ε01〉 =
√
F |0〉 |ε˜00〉+
√
D |1〉 |ε˜01〉 ,
|1〉 |ε〉 → |0〉 |ε10〉+ |1〉 |ε11〉 =
√
D |0〉 |ε˜10〉+
√
F |1〉 |ε˜11〉 ,
|+〉 |ε〉 → 1√
2
[|0〉 (|ε00〉+ |ε10〉) + |1〉 (|ε01〉+ |ε11〉)]
≡ |+〉 |ε++〉+ |−〉 |ε+−〉 ,
|−〉 |ε〉 → 1√
2
[|0〉 (|ε00〉 − |ε10〉) + |1〉 (|ε01〉 − |ε11〉)]
≡ |+〉 |ε−+〉+ |−〉 |ε−−〉 , (7)
where the states |εij〉 belong to the four-dimensional Hilbert space of Eve’s probe. Ancil-
lary states with tilde are intended to be normalized. The following conditions make the
transformations (7) unitary:
〈ε00|ε00〉+ 〈ε01|ε01〉 ≡ F +D = 1, (8)
〈ε10|ε10〉+ 〈ε11|ε11〉 ≡ D + F = 1, (9)
〈ε00|ε10〉+ 〈ε01|ε11〉 = 0. (10)
Within condition (10) we can set 〈ε00|ε10〉 = 〈ε01|ε11〉 = 0 if we assume that the attack
brought about by Eve is symmetric [3]. A symmetric attack is obtained when the distur-
bance introduced by Eve results to be the same in the two bases measured by the users.
Alice and Bob can test the occurrence of a symmetric attack by measuring the noise levels
in the two bases separately and verifying that they are equal. Intuitively, a symmetric
attack corresponds to the symmetric structure of the states prepared by the transmitter,
both in the LM05 and in the BB84 protocol. In fact, for the BB84, it has been shown to
be optimal (see Section VI.E of [3]). Our results are then limited to this class of individual
14
symmetric attacks. We specify the angles between non-orthogonal vectors as:
〈ε˜00|ε˜11〉 = cosx , 〈ε˜01|ε˜10〉 = cos y, (11)
with 0 ≤ x , y ≤ pi/2. In this sense the present strategy represents a non-orthogonal
attack. Here, we do not fix values of the parameters we introduced.
At point E2 of Fig.1 Eve performs an attack similar to that at point E1, but with fresh
ancillae |η〉 (hence new parameters F ′ and D′ are in order), to gain information about
Alice’s encoding:
|0〉 |η〉 →
√
F ′ |0〉 |η˜00〉+
√
D′ |1〉 |η˜01〉 ,
|1〉 |η〉 →
√
D′ |0〉 |η˜10〉+
√
F ′ |1〉 |η˜11〉 ,
|+〉 |η〉 → |+〉 |η++〉+ |−〉 |η+−〉 ,
|−〉 |η〉 → |+〉 |η−+〉+ |−〉 |η−−〉 . (12)
At the end of the transmission Eve will measure ε and η ancillae and she will gain in-
formation. Our next task is to recover the optimal eavesdropping strategy by Eve, i.e.
determine parameters’ values that maximize Alice-Eve and Bob-Eve mutual information
(IAE , IBE) minimizing the QBERs q1 and QAB.
From transformations (7) and conditions (8-10) we can easily evaluate q1 for each basis
prepared by Bob:
q1(Zˆ) = 〈ε01|ε01〉 = 〈ε10|ε10〉 = D, (13)
q1(Xˆ) = 〈ε+−|ε+−〉 = 〈ε−+|ε−+〉
= [1− F cosx−D cos y] /2. (14)
A good choice for Eve to minimize the QBER q1 is to align her measuring apparatus
with Zˆ and Xˆ at random. If she aligns along Zˆ then q1(Zˆ) = D = 0, otherwise it will be
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q1(Xˆ) to be zero. On average, after setting D = 0 (and so F = 1), we will have:
qav1 =
1− cosx
4
, (15)
and Eqs.(7) become:
|0〉 |ε〉 → |0〉 |ε00〉 ,
|1〉 |ε〉 → |1〉 |ε11〉 ,
|+〉 |ε〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉 |ε00〉+ |1〉 |ε11〉) ,
|−〉 |ε〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉 |ε00〉 − |1〉 |ε11〉) . (16)
From the above equations it is clear that the only relevant parameter is x: if it is zero
then Eve’s ancillae are parallel and do not provide any information to her, nor do they
cause any error on the channel since any evolved state remains equal to the initial one. On
the contrary, if x = pi/2 Eve’s ancillae are maximally informative to Eve, but maximum
is also the noise created on the channel, according to Eq.(15). Similar arguments hold for
the backward path, after E2-attack, with primed parameters replacing not-primed ones.
In order to evaluate the mutual information IAE let us write Bob’s initial states as:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
α=0,1
cα |α〉 , (17)
where we made the following ansatzes correspondingly to the initial states:
|0〉 → cα = δα,0,
|1〉 → cα = δα,1,
|+〉 → cα = 1√
2
,
|−〉 → cα = (−1)α 1√
2
. (18)
Then we can rewrite transformations (7) as
|Ψ〉 |ε〉 =
∑
α=0,1
cα |α〉 |ε〉 →
∑
α
cα
∑
β
|εαβ〉 |β〉 , (19)
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and transformations (12) as
|Ψ〉 |η〉 =
∑
α=0,1
cα |α〉 |η〉 →
∑
α
cα
∑
β
|ηαβ〉 |β〉 . (20)
Now suppose that Alice performs the identity Iˆ between the two Eve’s attacks. The
following sequence describes the state transformations:
|Ψ〉 |ε〉 |η〉 E1→
∑
α
cα
∑
β
|β〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉
I→
∑
α
cα
∑
β
|β〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉
E2→
∑
α
cα
∑
β,γ
|γ〉 |εαβ〉 |ηβγ〉 . (21)
The ancillary states involved in this operation are:
|ε00, η00〉 , |ε00, η01〉 , |ε01, η10〉 , |ε01, η11〉 ,
|ε10, η00〉 , |ε10, η01〉 , |ε11, η10〉 , |ε11, η11〉 . (22)
If, instead of the identity Iˆ, Alice performs the iYˆ operation we have:
|Ψ〉 |ε〉 |η〉 E1→
∑
α
cα
∑
β
|β〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉
iY→
∑
α
cα
∑
β
(−1)β+1 |β ⊕ 1〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉
E2→
∑
α
cα
∑
β,γ
(−1)β+1 |γ〉 |εαβ〉
∣∣η(β⊕1)γ〉 , (23)
and the involved ancillary states are:
|ε00, η10〉 , |ε00, η11〉 , |ε01, η00〉 , |ε01, η01〉 ,
|ε10, η10〉 , |ε10, η11〉 , |ε11, η00〉 , |ε11, η01〉 . (24)
In order to acquire information from states (21) and (23 ) Eve must measure both her
ancillae. Keeping in mind orthogonality relations (10) and following, we see that the best
way to do that is to distinguish orthogonal subspaces before, and then non-orthogonal
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states. The probability to make an error in distinguishing between two states with scalar
product cosx is (1− sinx) /2 [60]. Observing states (21) and (23) we can notice that if Eve
mistakes to identify her first ancilla (ε states) then she guesses the wrong Alice’s operation,
since she flips from states (21) and (23) or viceversa. The same is true if she guesses right
ε state but mistakes η state. Nevertheless, if she mistakes twice, then with the first error
she misinterprets (21) and (23) and with the second error she compensates the first one,
eventually guessing right Alice’s operation. This leads to estimate the probability Eve
wrongly guesses Alice’s operation, i.e. the QBER QAE between Alice and Eve, and from
it, considering F = F ′ = 1, we find the following expression for IAE :
IAE =
{
1−H
[(
1 + sinx
2
)(
1 + sinx′
2
)
+
(
1− sinx
2
)(
1− sinx′
2
)]}
. (25)
Then, to upper bound Eve’s information without affecting q1, we can simply use orthogonal
ancillae on the backward path, that means to set x′ = pi/2. In this case we obtain:
IAE = 1−H
(
1− sinx
2
)
. (26)
The last question concerns the mutual information between Bob and Eve. This is
limited by the fact that Bob does not reveal any basis in LM05. So if Eve guesses the
right basis in transformations (7) (probability equal to 1/2) then she has a probability
of error equal to her capability to discriminate her ancillae, given then by (1 − sinx)/2.
Otherwise, with probability 1/2, she guesses the wrong basis and she has a probability of
1/2 to be wrong with the qubit also. In the whole:
QBE =
2− sinx
4
. (27)
The security of the protocol now depends on the relation between QAB and q1. For
the purpose of comparison we assume here the same model as per Eq.(6), obtained for IR
attacks: QAB = q1. This is reasonable as the present strategy is a generalization of IR to
18
nonorthogonal Eve’s ancillae. With such an assumption it is possible to draw the curves
in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3: Mutual information vs q1 in NORT attack. The curves are: I
LM05
AE (dot-dashed line),
ILM05BE (dotted line), I
BB84
AE = I
BB84
BE (dashed line). The security thresholds are reported at the top
of the frame.
The increased information acquired by Eve using NORT rather than IR is apparent.
The security threshold for BB84 is now 14.6%, equal to the one obtained in [59] for the
optimal single-particle eavesdropping. On the contrary, the thresholds for LM05 are 10.0%
and 25.0% for DR and RR respectively. Hence LM05 used in RR is more tolerant to noise
than BB84, provided that Eve’s action is limited to a NORT attack.
C. Double CNOT attack - DCNOT
So far we have analyzed attacks in which Eve measures the qubit coming out from
Bob’s station. As we have seen this kind of attack can provide Eve with a high mutual
information with Alice. However the mutual information between Eve and Bob is poor, as
19
illustrated by the Figures 2 and 3. The reason is that Eve’s initial measurement modifies
the state prepared by Bob, and prevents her from knowing the outcome of Bob’s final
measurement. It is then natural to ask whether is possible for Eve to perform her attack
without altering Bob’s state, thus maximizing her mutual information with Bob. This
attack exists and has been introduced for the first time in [48]. It is composed by a
sequence of two CNOT gates from Eve, one for each path of the LM05; hence we call it
Double CNOT attack, in short “DCNOT”. We will show that DCNOT can make IBE ,
distilled in the RR modality, equal to its maximum and to IAE , thus reducing the LM05
security to the security obtained in the DR modality.
Let us study the evolution of the states prepared by Bob under the action of the first
CNOT gate by Eve. Eve appends an ancilla in the state |0〉e to the initial states prepared
by Bob; then she performs a first CNOT gate before Alice’s station using the traveling
qubit as control and her ancilla as target. The states become:
|0〉 |0〉e → |0〉 |0〉e ,
|1〉 |0〉e → |1〉 |1〉e ,
|+〉 |0〉e →
|0〉 |0〉e + |1〉 |1〉e√
2
,
|−〉 |0〉e →
|0〉 |0〉e − |1〉 |1〉e√
2
. (28)
We can notice that when Bob prepares states in the basis Xˆ the CNOT gate creates an
entangled state with the traveling qubit and Eve’s ancilla. After that Eve forwards the
control qubit to Alice, who performs her encoding Aˆi (Aˆ0 = Iˆ and Aˆ1 = iYˆ ) on it and
then sends it back to Bob. Eve, on the backward path, executes a second CNOT gate on
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the whole system. We report Alice’s and Eve’s actions as:
(
Aˆi |0〉
)
|0〉e →
(
Aˆi |0〉
)
|i〉e ,(
Aˆi |1〉
)
|1〉e →
(
Aˆi |1〉
)
|i〉e ,(
Aˆi |0〉
)
|0〉e +
(
Aˆi |1〉
)
|1〉e√
2
→
(
Aˆi |+〉
)
|i〉e ,(
Aˆi |0〉
)
|0〉e −
(
Aˆi |1〉
)
|1〉e√
2
→ −
(
Aˆi |−〉
)
|i〉e . (29)
From these equations we can recognize that the entanglement created by Eve in the first
CNOT gate disappears with the second CNOT. Furthermore, Eve’s ancillae take exactly
the information encoded by Alice; hence it is sufficient for Eve to measure them in the
basis Zˆ to find out Alice’s encoding: |0〉e indicates that Alice performed the identity, while
|1〉e indicates the spin-flip operation. Finally, after the second CNOT the state arriving
to Bob is just the right state he expected to receive! This entails two consequences:
i) in the DCNOT QAB = 0. If Alice and Bob use only QAB as a security parameter,
they will never detect this kind of attack by Eve. However, for the same reason, the mutual
information between Alice and Bob, which is a function of QAB, is always equal to 1.
ii) Eve acquires full information about both Alice (IAE) and Bob (IBE). In fact she
knows perfectly the encoded transformation and the result that is going to be obtained
by Bob.
The DCNOT attack can be detected in CM. If the qubit is prepared in the basis Zˆ Eve
does not perturb the state at all while if it was prepared in the basis Xˆ the QBER q1 is
equal to 1/2. Hence the overall QBERs and information situation for this attack is:
q1 = 0.25, (30)
QAB = 0⇒ IAB = 1, (31)
IAE = IBE = 1. (32)
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These equations are quite similar to Eqs. (5) obtained for the IR attack, with the important
difference that QAB is now zero and, by consequence, IAB is always equal to 1, as per
Eq.(32). Hence, by making use of the CK theorem, Eq.(2), we can conclude that the LM05
provides a secure rate against DCNOT over the whole interval of q1.
Likewise IR, if Eve performs the DCNOT in a partial way, her information will be a
linear function of the QBER q1; then the corresponding curve would be exactly the same
as the one depicting ILM05AE in Fig. 2. We report such a curve in Fig. 4.
An important modification to the DCNOT is the following. Eve executes a random
flip/no-flip unitary operation, analogous to the one effected by Alice, after the second
CNOT, on the backward path. In this way Eve increases QAB, from its minimum value 0
to any desired value χ and decreases the mutual information between Alice and Bob from
its maximum value 1 to any other value imposed by her. Furthermore, with this kind of
modified DCNOT attack, which we term DCNOT∗, Eve still maintains the control about
Bob’s final measurement outcome, as in the non-modified DCNOT. The situation for the
DCNOT∗ attack is then summarized by the following equations:
q1 = 0.25ξ,
QAB = χ⇒ IAB = 1−H(χ),
IAE = IBE = ξ, (33)
with χ ∈ [0, 0.5] a parameter controlled by Eve and ξ the fraction of attacked qubits,
as already defined for IR attacks. We can again assume the noise model of Eq.(6) to
compare this new attack with the previous ones, i.e. QAB = q1. The corresponding curves
are plotted in Fig. 4.
The LM05 protocol results secure, both in DR and in RR, if q1 < 11.9%. Hence, by
comparing with Figs. 2 and 3, it is seen that this attack is less dangerous than NORT as
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FIG. 4: Mutual information IAB (solid line) and I
LM05
AE = I
LM05
BE (dot-dashed line) versus q1 in
the DCNOT attack against LM05. The security threshold is reported at the top of the frame.
far as IAE is concerned, but is far more dangerous for what concerns the security threshold
pertaining to IBE , which decreases from 25.0% to 11.9%.
D. Generic individual attack
In this section we provide an upper bound to Eve’s information in case of single-
particle attack. We adapt to LM05 an argument recently introduced in [25], which in
turn is based on the main argument of [5] limited to the case of an individual attack.
We remark that such a proof holds when LM05 is used for QKD, not for a deterministic
Direct Communication [21]. We also stress that the proof given in [25] and repeated here
for LM05 does not represent a security proof against the most general attack by Eve,
i.e. a coherent attack of a two-way deterministic protocol. In fact, the argument does
not include any multi-particle distillation of quantum states performed by the users, nor
multi-particle attacks by Eve [61].
23
As a first step of the generic individual attack by Eve suppose that the users are
provided by Eve with a state which is claimed to be a perfect singlet:
|ψAB〉 = (|0〉A |1〉B − |1〉A |0〉B) /
√
2, (34)
where the states |0〉 and |1〉 are the eigenstates of the basis Z, the computational basis.
If the state (34) were a truly singlet, the users would perform LM05 as follows. Bob
measures his particle in one of the two bases Z or X chosen at random, thus preparing
Alice’s particle’s state in a state orthogonal to his state. In EM, Alice performs on her
particle the desired operation Iˆ or iY , exactly as she would do in the standard prepare-
and-measure LM05. All the same, in CM, Alice measures her particle in a basis randomly
chosen between Z or X. This reduces the entanglement-based LM05 to a prepare-and-
measure protocol. Once the security is shown for the former it is automatically true for
the latter.
The next task is for the users to verify that they actually have been given by Eve
the claimed state. In practice they must verify that the fidelity F (|ψAB〉 , ρAB) between
the claimed state and the state ρAB in their hands is very close to 1. Hence consider a
tripartite state |Φ〉ABE which is a purification of ρAB and which is in Eve’s hands:
ρAB = trE (|Φ〉ABE 〈Φ|) (35)
ρE = trAB (|Φ〉ABE 〈Φ|) . (36)
Then S(ρAB) = S (ρE), where S is the Von Neumann entropy [49], because |Φ〉ABE is pure
and then ρAB and ρE have the same spectrum. Hence Alice and Bob can calculate Eve’s
maximum information from the relation S(ρAB) = S (ρE) provided they can estimate
S(ρAB). To this aim the users perform the CM. In particular they measure the QBER q1
which is equal to the infidelity δ of Ref. [5], which is defined by the relation
F (|ψAB〉 , ρAB)2 ≥ 1− δ. (37)
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As a result, if q1 is not too large, the state ρAB is acknowledged to be very similar to
|ψAB〉 by the users. In particular, since they verify that F (|ψAB〉 , ρAB)2 ≥ 1 − q1 then
from the Lemma “High fidelity implies low entropy” of Ref. [5] one has:
S(ρAB) = S (ρE) ≤ − (1− q1) log2 (1− q1)− q1 log2
(q1
3
)
. (38)
This represents an upper bound to Eve’s absolute information at the end of the forward
path, in full analogy with what happens in the BB84 protocol. What we need now is a
connection with the backward path. Between the two paths, Alice encodes information
on her particle. So let us make a step back and focus on the mutual information between
Alice and Eve, IAE .
It is known that the Holevo information is un upper bound to the mutual informa-
tion [49]:
IAE ≤ χ(ρAE), (39)
with ρAE = trB (|Φ〉ABE 〈Φ|) and χ(ρ) = S(ρ) −
∑
k S(ρk). Furthermore the following
relations trivially hold:
χ(ρAE) ≤ S(ρAE) ≤ S(ρE), (40)
with ρE = trA (ρAE). The last equation is an intuitive corollary to the Holevo theorem
cited as “Lemma 2” in Ref. [5]. So, it turns out that the upper bound S(ρE) available to
Alice and Bob is an upper bound both to the mutual information IAE and to the Holevo
quantity χ(ρAE). As stated in Ref. [25] the Holevo quantity does not increase under
quantum operations. In particular Alice’s encoding operations cannot increase χ(ρAE).
By consequence one has:
χ(ρAE)
after ≤ χ(ρAE)before ≤ S(ρE) (41)
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FIG. 5: General attack security for LM05 in DR. The security threshold amounts to q1 = 8.8%.
For q1 > 18.9% Eve gets full information about Alice’s encoding.
where the labels “before” and “after” refer to Alice’s encoding. So S(ρE) represents a
bound to Eve’s information even after Alice’s encoding.
To conclude the proof it suffices to note that even if Eve can increase S(ρE) on the
backward path, e.g. by attaching new ancillae to the traveling states, the increase in
information does not concern Alice’s encoding. So it would be the same for Eve if she
increases her information since the beginning on the forward path; but in that case the
users already have the bound of Eq.(41).
Now it is possible to use the CK theorem, Eq.(2), and the noise model of Eq.(6) to
make a guess about how tight the given bound is. In this model the mutual information
IAB is given by 1 − H(q1) while from Eq.(38) we get un upper bound to Eve’s average
information. The curves pertaining to the mutual information are plotted in Fig. 5. They
are compatible with the previous results since the found threshold, q1 ≤ 8.8%, is lower than
all previous single-particle attacks, both in DR and in RR. Note however that the given
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bound is meaningful only for LM05 in DR since it is based on the Holevo information bound
Eq.(41) which makes explicit reference to Alice’s encoding and none to Bob’s measurement.
However although the security threshold pertaining to RR could be higher than that for
DR, it cannot be too much different because we provided an explicit attack, the DCNOT∗,
which gives a security threshold of 11.9% for LM05 in RR, only 35% higher than the above
threshold. Moreover, limiting the analysis to DR, it turns out that the security bound
just given is quite tight. In fact, with the NORT attack we found a security threshold of
10.0%, which is only 13.6% higher than the given bound.
Finally let us note that the above bound holds trivially for BB84 as well, where Alice
does not encode information on the received state. In this case however the bound is not
tight as 8.8% is far smaller than the 14.6% pertaining to the optimal individual attack
against BB84 [59].
Before moving to the next Section and study the zero-QBER attacks, we summarize
the results found for the zero-loss individual eavesdropping in Table I.
Eve’s strategy LM05-DR (%) LM05-RR (%) BB84 (%)
IR 11.9 25.0 17.1
NORT 10.0 25.0 14.6
DCNOT ∗ 11.9 11.9 x
Generic 8.8 x 8.8
TABLE I: security thresholds for single-particle attacks against LM05 in DR, LM05 in RR and
BB84.
IV. ZERO-QBER EAVESDROPPING
We now consider attacks that introduce losses, but no noise. If Alice uses a perfect
single-photon source the single photon can only be detected either by Eve or by Bob.
27
However in practice Alice uses an approximated single-photon source i.e. an attenuated
laser beam. For this source the number of photon per pulse follows a Poisson statistics. It
is then possible that a single pulse contains more than one photon in the same quantum
state, and that both Eve and Bob detect the same qubit. In this case Eve steals one bit of
information without introducing any noise in Bob’s measurement; however she introduces
losses. Alice and Bob, from the knowledge of the loss rate, should be able to infer how
much information has been stolen and remove it by means of Privacy Amplification [62, 63].
It is worth noting that in the hypothesis of zero-QBER attacks the mutual information
between Alice and Bob is always maximum and no Error Correction is needed to reconcile
users’ keys. Another obvious consequence of this assumption is that Eve does not acquire
any further information from the Error Correction procedure. So her knowledge will derive
entirely from her attack to the quantum channel.
A. Beam splitting attack - BS
In the Beam Splitting attack (BS) Eve uses a beam-splitter of transmissivity T = 1−R
to deviate a fraction R of the main beam towards her detectors, which are supposed to be
ideal (100% quantum efficiency, no dark counts). The approach for BS is very similar to
the one adopted for the IR attack: we first evaluate the probability of success for an Eve
eavesdropping one bit of information; then we relate the photon emitted by the source to
the eavesdropped bits via the Binomial distribution.
Let us first analyze the BB84 [57]. Define µ as the average number of photons contained
in each pulse prepared by Alice. With her beam-splitter Eve splits a fraction Rµ from the
main beam towards her (ideal) detectors, so that the probability to successfully detect a
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photon is given by:
P = 1− e−Rµ ≈ Rµ. (42)
The above approximation holds when µ 1. Usually in the experiments on BB84 µ = 0.1.
It is reasonable to assume that R ' 1 because usually the attenuation rate measured
by Alice and Bob is very close to the unity at wavelength of 1550 nm. Hence Eve’s
probability to successfully detect a photon is about µ. We also conservatively assume that
Eve possesses a perfect quantum memory to store the bits until the moment in which
the basis is revealed by Alice and Bob, so that every stored photon is detected by Eve in
the right basis. This means that µ represents the average information collected by Eve
against BB84 through the BS attack in the asymptotic limit of a large number N of pulses
traveling on the channel:
IBB84E = µ. (43)
This expression can be used to provide a secure gain similar to that obtained for IR attack.
Specifically the secure gain GBB84 is:
GBB84 = GBB84raw ×
(
1− IBB84E
)
, (44)
where:
GBB84raw = 1− exp
[−µ× ηd × ΓBB84 (L)] , (45)
ΓBB84 (L) = ΓQC (L)× ΓB (total transmission), (46)
ΓQC (L) = 10
−0.02×L (transmission of the quantum channel), (47)
with parameters ηd = 0.12 (efficiency of Bob’s detectors), ΓB = 0.4 (transmission of Bob’s
box), and µ is optimized for every distance L in order to give the maximum secure gain.
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In analogy with BB84 one can calculate the amount of Privacy Amplification [62, 63]
necessary to cope with BS in LM05. Being LM05 a two-way protocol the BS must be
accomplished using two beam-splitters rather than one, positioned in the two paths of the
communication channel. In this way it may happen that Eve measures two photons, one
from the forward path and one from the backward one; then, by comparing her outcomes,
Eve can ascertain the encoded information. Let R1 and R2 be the reflectivity of the two
beam-splitters. After the first beam-splitter Eve has a probability of successful detection
P1 = 1− e−R1µ. (48)
The fraction of the beam transmitted through the first beam-splitter is T1µ = (1−R1)µ.
Then the fraction of the beam deviated by the second beam-splitter is R2(1− R1)µ, and
Eve’s probability to detect a photon in the second path is:
P2 = 1− e−R2(1−R1)µ. (49)
A successful eavesdropping is given by two successful detection events in the same run:
PBS12 = P1 · P2 =
(
1− e−R1µ) (1− e−R2(1−R1)µ) . (50)
From this expression it is straightforward to check that the value of R1 = 1/2 maximizes
PBS12 for any µ. An intuitive way to understand this is to take R2 ' 1, to let Eve read
as much information as possible from the backward path, and to realize that in this case
Eve’s best choice is to analyze half of the beam from the forward path and half from the
backward one, i.e. to set R1 = 1/2. Inserting these values into Eq.(50) we have:
PBS12 ≤
(
1− e−µ/2
)2 ≡ P ∗ = 1− 2e−µ/2 + e−µ, (51)
which represents the average information acquired by Eve through the BS attack against
the LM05 protocol, both in DR and RR, in the asymptotic limit of an infinite number of
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pulses traveling on the two-way quantum channel [34]:
ILM05E = P
∗. (52)
This expression can be used to provide a secure gain similar to that previously obtained
for BB84. Specifically the secure gain GLM05 is:
GLM05 = GLM05raw ×
(
1− ILM05E
)
, (53)
where:
GLM05raw = 1− exp
[−µ× ηd × ΓLM05 (L)] , (54)
ΓLM05 (L) = Γ2QC (L)× ΓB × Γ2A (total transmission), (55)
ΓQC (L) = 10
−0.02×L (transmission of the quantum channel), (56)
with parameters ηd = 0.12 (efficiency of Bob’s detectors), ΓB = 0.4 (transmission of Bob’s
box), ΓA = 0.45 (transmission of Alice’s box) and µ is optimized for every distance L.
Note that the crucial equation is that defining ΓLM05 (L) which, with respect to BB84,
contains the square of ΓQC (L), because the channel is two-way, and the term Γ
2
A, which
represents the double-transmission of Alice’s setup because the photon passes twice in it
before going back to Bob. The values of the parameters reported after Eq.(56) are similar
to those experimentally measured in Ref. [34].
In Figure 6 we plot log10G
BB84 and log10G
LM05. It can be noted that the secure rate
pertaining to LM05 is far smaller than that pertaining to BB84. This crucially depends
on the higher loss-rate of the two-way channel of LM05.
However in the next Section we show that the difference between the two protocols in
the frame of zero-QBER attacks can be dramatically reduced when the Photon-Number
Splitting (PNS) attack by Eve is considered. This is due to the higher resistance offered
by LM05 against this kind of attacks.
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FIG. 6: Plot of the secure gain of BB84 (GBB84, Eq.(44), dashed line) and LM05 (GLM05, Eq.(53),
solid line) versus the length of the communication channel, in case of BS attack by Eve. The BB84
is superior to LM05 for all the distances. This is due to the double loss-rate of the two-way LM05
protocol.
B. Photon-number splitting attack - PNS
In the following we describe the Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) attack [15, 64–67]
against the present version of the LM05 protocol. This attack has been previously de-
scribed in [51] for the original LM05 protocol. The removal of the test on the backward
channel does not present any major subtleties: it is simply replaced by the test of the
QBER QAB, which obliges Eve to perform an attack on at least three photons (see the
following explanation) to not introduce any disturbance on the channel.
As mentioned in the previous Section IV A, when the photon source is a laser attenuated
with an average photon number per pulse µ, the probability to have n photons in a single
pulse is given by a Poisson distribution:
Pn (µ) =
µn
n!
e−µ. (57)
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This means that with a probability Pn (µ) Bob prepares the state |ψ〉⊗n rather than the
desired state |ψ〉 (ψ indicates one of the four states prepared by Bob in BB84 and LM05).
This accidental redundancy can be exploited by Eve to perform a perfect zero-QBER
attack.
It is known [68] that when n = 3 it exists a measurementM that provides a conclusive
result about the absolute polarization ψ with (optimal) probability 1/2. Eve can exploit
this fact to eavesdrop on LM05 protocol in the following way. She performs a quantum
nondemolition measurement (QND) on the pulses as soon as they exit Bob’s station;
this can be done without perturbing the state ψ: when she finds n < 3 she blocks the
pulses; on the pulses with at least three photons she executesM and if the outcome is not
conclusive she blocks these pulses as well; when n ≥ 3 and the outcome ofM is conclusive
she prepares a new photon in the right state ψ and forwards it to Alice. Until here this
attack is completely analogous to the ‘IRUD-attack’ described in [68]. The only variant
is that Eve measures again the photon on the backward path after Alice’s encoding, to
capture the information. Since Eve did know the state entering Alice’s box she can extract
the information without perturbing the state. After that she forwards the photon in the
correct state to Bob. We call this first PNS attack PNSM.
A second attack is more peculiar to LM05. Suppose that n = 2 and call the two
photons in the pulse p1 and p2. As before Eve can know the number of photons per pulse
through a QND measure. When n < 2 Eve blocks the pulses. When n = 2 she stores
p1 and forwards p2 to Alice; this let her remain undetected during a possible CM on the
forward path. On the way back Eve captures again p2. To gain Alice’s information she
must decide whether the polarizations of p1 and p2 are parallel or antiparallel: in the
first case she would deduce the logical value ‘0’; in the second case she would deduce ‘1’.
However, the discrimination between parallel and antiparallel spins is not as simple as it
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appears at a first glimpse: while the parallel-spin-state |P 〉 = |ψ〉p1 |ψ〉p2 is symmetric, the
antiparallel-spin-state |AP 〉 = |ψ〉p1 |ψ⊥〉p2 is neither symmetric nor antisymmetric. Upon
symmetrizing |AP 〉 we can realize that it is not orthogonal to |P 〉, and by consequence it
is not perfectly distinguishable from it (we remand to [69], [70] for a complete treatment
of this problem). Actually an optimal measurement M′ is a nonlocal one and gives Eve
a conclusive result (between |P 〉 and |AP 〉) with a probability 1/4 [69]. Hence Eve can
block all the “inconclusive” pulses to gain full information and still remain undetected.
However it remains open the question of which photon must Eve forward to Bob: upon
obtaining this result, Eve does not know whether to give Bob the state |ψ〉 or the state
|ψ⊥〉, because she ignores the absolute value of ψ prepared by Bob. This shows that two
photons are not sufficient for a perfect eavesdropping with M′. Yet the complete attack
can be accomplished with an additional photon p3: Eve should store p3, execute M′, and
eventually encode p3 according to the conclusive outcome of M′; the photon prepared in
this way can be forwarded to Bob without risk of detection.
The above analysis establishes that a perfect eavesdropping can be realized with at
least three photons in a pulse. It also establishes that the measurement M represents a
more powerful resource for Eve than M′, for a number of reasons: it gives information
on the complete state ψ of the photons, not only on Alice’s operation; the probability
of conclusive results is 1/2 rather than 1/4; Eve knows about the conclusiveness of her
measurement immediately, rather than after Alice’s encoding, and can use this information
to improve her strategy. For these reasons we only consider the robustness of LM05 against
the PNSM attack following [51].
In case of PNS attacks it was shown in [66] that a communication is secure until the
signal sent by Alice arrives at Bob’s with a probability higher than the probability to
generate a multi-photon. In our present case the signal is the raw gain Graw, previously
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introduced for BB84, Eq.(45), and LM05, Eq.(54), where we have neglected the contribu-
tion of the dark counts. Hence, for BB84, the transmission is secure when the following
condition is fulfilled:
DBB84 = GBB84raw − PBB84PNS > 0, (58)
with GBB84raw defined by Eq.(45) and
PBB84PNS =
∞∑
i=2
e−µ
µi
i!
= 1− e−µ (1 + µ)
the probability that Alice accidentally emits 2 or more photons in a single pulse.
All the same, for the LM05 we have:
DLM05 = GLM05raw − PLM05PNS > 0, (59)
with GLM05raw defined by Eq.(54) and
PLM05PNS =
( ∞∑
i=3
e−µ
µi
i!
)
− 1
2
µ3
6
e−µ = 1− e−µ
(
1 + µ+
µ2
2
+
1
2
µ3
6
)
the probability that Alice emits a number of photons dangerous for LM05, as discussed
above.
Then we plot in Fig. 7 log10D
BB84 and log10D
LM05 and obtain a comparison of the
security regions pertaining to BB84 and LM05. Differently from the BS attack, for the
PNS attacks the BB84 is more performant than LM05 on longer distances, higher than
2.55 Km with our parameters, but LM05 is more performant on shorter distances. Hence,
while losses remain an important limiting factor for any two-way quantum communication,
the higher protection from PNS attacks of the LM05 with respect to BB84 could enable
an advantage in terms of the secure rate for small-range setups like the one in [71].
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FIG. 7: Plot of the security regions of BB84 (DBB84, Eq.(58), from the dashed line to the axis
of abscissae) and LM05 (DLM05, Eq.(59), from the solid line to the axis of abscissae) versus the
length of the communication channel, in case of PNS attack by Eve. The BB84 is superior to
LM05 for longer distances, but LM05 is superior on shorter distances. This is due to the higher
resistance of LM05 to PNS-like attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In the present work we have described and characterized a practical version of the two-
way QKD protocol LM05 by considering the most relevant single-particle eavesdropping
strategies against it.
The security of the scheme is guaranteed by two QBERs, q1 and QAB, which are not
trivially related one to each other. By assuming a noise model where q1 = QAB it turns
out that the most powerful attack against LM05 in direct reconciliation is the NORT,
which provides an upper bound to secure QKD equal to q1 = QAB = 10.0%, while the
most powerful attack in reverse reconciliation is the DCNOT∗, which provides a threshold
of q1 = QAB = 11.9%. The adopted noise model is based on the experimental evidence
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that one-way and two-way channels can be controlled with the same level of precision.
However other noise models can be considered as well, for instance one in which q1 = 15%
and QAB = 0. In this case, if Eve performs individual attacks only, it is not possible
to distill a secure key with the BB84 protocol, while it is possible with the LM05. This
in our opinion underlines the intrinsic difference between the two ways of performing
QKD and encourages further research in this area. Moreover it is worth recalling that in
the present version of LM05 we did not include a QBER test on the backward path of
the communication channel; such an option, though not very practical, can improve the
obtained secrecy capacities.
In the limited scenario of single-particle attacks, we have compared the two-way LM05
protocol with the standard BB84, which uses a one-way quantum channel. We have found
that the main limitation of two-way QKD is the high loss-rate, even if it is partially
counter-balanced by the higher resistance to PNS-like attacks. This entails that the field
of application of two-way QKD shall be limited to short communication channels, like
those typical of a QKD network, where the optimal average distance is about 17 Km [72].
Even so a conclusive answer about the two modes of performing QKD can come only
from a quantitative unconditional security proof for two-way QKD, which is still lacking
at present. In this respect, it is our opinion that specific tools should be developed for this
task, e.g. an entanglement-based description specific to two-way QKD. In fact, any argu-
ment too closely related to one-way QKD fails to capture all the peculiarities of two-way
QKD, like the encoding on operators rather than on statesand the reverse reconciliation
of the key.
While we are aware that further studies are needed to make the LM05 protocol and
two-way QKD in general viable for applications, we are also confident that the multi-way
use of a quantum channel could play an important role in future developments of quantum
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cryptography.
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